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ON THE IDEAL SHORTEST VECTOR PROBLEM OVER
RANDOM RATIONAL PRIMES
YANBIN PAN, JUN XU, NICK WADLEIGH, AND QI CHENG
Abstract. Any ideal in a number field can be factored into a product of
prime ideals. In this paper we study the prime ideal shortest vector problem
(SVP) in the ring Z[x]/(x2
n
+1), a popular choice in the design of ideal lattice
based cryptosystems. We show that a majority of rational primes lie under
prime ideals admitting a polynomial time algorithm for SVP. Although the
shortest vector problem of ideal lattices underpins the security of Ring-LWE
cryptosystem, this work does not break Ring-LWE, since the security reduction
is from the worst case ideal SVP to the average case Ring-LWE, and it is one-
way.
Keywords: ring-LWE, ideal lattice, average case computational complexity
1. Introduction
Due to their conjectured ability to resist quantum computer attack, lattice-based
cryptosystems have drawn considerable attention. In 1996, Ajtai [1] pioneered the
research on worst-case to average-case reduction for the Short Integer Solution prob-
lem (SIS). In 2005, Regev [28] presented a worst-case to average-case (quantum)
reduction for the Learning With Errors problem (LWE). SIS and LWE became two
important cryptographic primitives, and a large number of cryptographic schemes
based on these two problems have been designed. However, the common draw-
back of such schemes is their limited efficiency owing to the absence of algebraic
structures in SIS and LWE.
The first lattice-based scheme with some algebraic structure was the NTRU pub-
lic key cryptosystem [14], which was introduced by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman
in 1996. It works in the convolution ring Z[x]/(xp−1) where p is a prime. The cycli-
cal nature of the ring Z[x]/(xp − 1) contributes to NTRU’s efficiency, and makes
NTRU one of the most popular schemes. Later the ring was employed in many
other cryptographic primitives, such as [21, 18, 26, 22, 31, 4].
In 2009, Stehlé et al. [32] introduced a structured and more efficient variant of
LWE, which involves the ring Fp[x]/(x
N+1)whereN is a power of 2 and p is a prime
satisfying p ≡ 3 (mod 8). In 2010, Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [19] presented
a ring-based variant of LWE, called Ring-LWE. The hardness of problems in [32, 19]
is based on worst-case assumptions on ideal lattices. Recently, Peikert, Regev and
Stephens-Davidowitz [25] presented a polynomial time quantum reduction from
(worst-case) ideal lattice problems to Ring-LWE for any modulus and any number
field. Since then, more and more schemes employ the ring Z[x]/(xN +1) where N is
a power of 2, for example, NewHope [2], Crystals-Kyber [7], and LAC [17] submitted
to NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization. Although solving the ideal
SVP does not necessarily break Ring-LWE, any weakness of ideal SVP casts doubt
on the security of Ring-LWE.
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1.1. Previous works. Principal ideal lattices are a class of important ideal lattices
which can be generated by a single element. There is a line of work focusing on
the principal ideal SVP. Based on [8, 3], solving approx-SVP problems on principal
ideal lattices can be divided into the following two steps: Step 1 is finding an ideal
generator by using class group computations. In this step, a quantum polynomial
time algorithm is presented by Biasse and Song [6], which is based on the work [13];
a classical subexponential time algorithm was given by Biasse, Espitau, Fouque,
Gélin and Kirchner [5]. Step 2 is shortening the ideal generator in Step 1 with
the log-unit lattice. This step was analyzed by Cramer, Ducas, Peikert and Regev
[9]. Then a quantum polynomial time algorithm for approx-SVP, with a 2O˜(
√
N)
approximation factor, on principal ideal lattices in cyclotomic number fields was
presented in [9].
In 2017, Cramer, Ducas and Wesolowski [10] extended the case of principal ideal
lattices in [9] to the case of a general ideal lattice in a cyclotomic ring of prime-
power conductor. For approx-SVP on ideal lattices, the result in [10] is better
than the BKZ algorithm [29] when the approximation factor is larger than 2O˜(
√
N).
Ducas, Plancon and Wesolowski [11] analyzed the approximation factor 2O˜(
√
N) in
[9, 10] to determine the specific dimension N so that the corresponding algorithms
outperform BKZ for an ideal lattice in cyclotomic number fields. Recently, Pellet-
Mary, Hanrot and Stehlé [27], inspired by the algorithms in [9, 10], solved approx-
SVP with the approximation factor 2O˜(
√
N) in ideal lattices for all number fields,
aiming to provide trade-offs between the approximation factor and the running
time. However, there is an exponential pre-processing phase.
1.2. Our results. In this paper, we investigate the SVP of prime ideals. The
density of prime ideals is not as high as that of principal ideals. In the simple
case of the ring of rational integers Z, every ideal is principal, while the density of
prime numbers among the positive integers ≤ n is only about 1/ logn. On the other
hand, every nonzero ideal in a Dedekind Domain can be factored uniquely into a
product of prime ideals, so short vectors in prime ideals may help us to find short
vectors in general ideals. If, in a general prime ideal p, we are able to efficiently
find a vector with length within the Minkowski bound for p, then for an ideal a
with few prime ideal factors, we will be able to approximate the shortest vector in
a to within a factor much better than what is achieved by the LLL [15] or BKZ [30]
algorithms. The most difficult step in factoring an ideal is actually factorization
of an integer (the norm of the ideal), which can be done in polynomial time by
quantum computers, or in subexponential time by classical computers.
In this paper, we begin an in-depth study of the SVP of prime ideals in the rings
Z[x]/(x2
n
+ 1), which are quite popular in cryptography. We show that there is a
hierarchy for the hardness of SVP for these prime ideal lattices. Roughly speaking,
we can classify such prime ideal lattices into n distinct classes, and for a prime
ideal lattice in the r-th class, we can find its shortest vector by solving SVP in
a 2r-dimensional lattice. This suggests that the difficulty of prime ideal SVP can
change dramatically from ideal to ideal, an interesting phenomenon that has, to
our knowledge, not been pointed out in the literature. See Theorem 3.2 for more
details. By considering certain of these classes, we prove that a nontrivial fraction
of prime ideals admit an efficient SVP algorithm.
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Proposition 1.1. Let N = 2n, where n is a positive integer. Let p be a prime ideal
in the ring Z[x]/(xN+1), and suppose p contains a prime number p ≡ ±3 (mod 8).
Then under the coefficient embedding (see Page 6 for definition), the shortest vector
in p can be found in time poly(N, log p), and the length of the shortest vector is
exactly
√
p.
Can we conclude from the above result that the average case prime ideal SVP is
easy? It depends how we define an average prime ideal lattice. As prime ideals are
rigid structures, changing distributions gives us totally different complexity results.
If norms of prime ideals are selected uniformly at random, then easy cases are rare.
Nevertheless our result does show that an average case of the prime ideal SVP in
power-of-two cyclotomic fields is not hard, if the rational primes contained in the
ideals are selected uniformly at random. See Subsection 3.3 for details.
The algorithm can be adapted to any Galois extension L of Q. Indeed, fix a
prime ideal P in the ring of integers, OL, of L. The subgroup of Gal(L/Q) that
stabilizes P set-wise is known as the decomposition group of P. Let K ⊂ L be the
subfield fixed by the decomposition group of P. To find a short vector in P, we can
search for a short vector in the lattice P ∩K, which has smaller dimension. More
precisely, for a rational prime p, if pOL is factored into a product of g prime ideals
in OL, we can reduce the problem of finding a short vector in any of these prime
ideals to a problem of finding a short vector in a dimension-g lattice, provided that
the determinant of the sublattice is not too large compared to the original lattice.
For general (non prime) ideals in Z[x]/(x2
n
+ 1), we present an algorithm to
confirm that the hierarchy for the hardness of SVP also exists; That is, we can solve
SVP for an ideal lattice by solving SVP in a 2r-dimensional lattice, for some positive
integer r related to the factorization of the ideal (see Theorem 4.1). Following
Proposition 1.1, we show how to solve the SVP for ideals all of whose prime factors
lie in a certain class. This is a special case of Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 1.2. Let N = 2n, where n is a positive integer. Let I be an ideal in
the ring Z[x]/(xN + 1) with prime factorization
I = p1p2 · · · pk.
If each pi contains a prime integer ≡ ±3 (mod 8), the shortest vector in I can be
found in time poly(N, log(N (I))).
We would like to stress that the algorithm works by exploiting the multiplication
structure of ideals in the ring of integers of a number field. This appears to be new.
More interestingly, our algorithm does not need to factor the ideal. We regard
this as the second contribution of this work, in addition to the algorithm for prime
ideals.
1.3. Paper organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we give some mathematical preliminaries needed. In Section 3 and 4,
we first sketch an idea for a solution to SVP in the fully general setting of a finite
Galois extension of Q. Then we present our algorithms solving SVP for prime ideal
lattices and general ideal lattices in Z[ζ2n+1 ]. Finally, a conclusion and some open
problems are given in Section 5.
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2. Mathematical preliminary
2.1. Lattice. Lattices are discrete additive subgroups of RN . Any finite set of
vectors b1, b2, · · · , bm ∈ RN generate a lattice:
L =
{
m∑
i=1
zibi| zi ∈ Z
}
.
When the bi are linearly independent and B is the matrix whose column vectors
are bi, we say B is a matrix for L; m and N are the rank and dimension of L,
respectively. If m = N , we define the determinant of L, denoted by det(L), to be
| det(B)|.
The shortest vector problem (SVP), the problem of finding a shortest nonzero
lattice vector in a given lattice, is one of the most famous hard problems in lattice
cryptography. Denote by λ1(L) the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector in
an N -dimensional lattice L. Minkowski’s theorem [23] tells us that
λ1(L) ≤ 2V1/NN
· det(L) 1N ≤
√
N · det(L) 1N ,
where VN is the volume of the N -dimensional ball with radius 1. The closest vector
problem (CVP) is another famous hard problem in lattice cryptography. This refers
to the problem of finding a lattice vector that is closest to a given vector.
2.2. Ideal in Z[ζ2n+1 ]. The cyclotomic field of order 2N = 2
n+1 is widely used in
cryptography. Its ring of integers is Z[ζ2n+1 ], which is isomorphic to Z[x]/(x
N +1).
Its discriminant is 2n2
n
.
Let p be a rational prime, and let
xN + 1 = (f1f2 · · · fg)e
be the prime factorization of xN + 1 in the polynomial ring Fp[x]. Then we have
(p) = (p1p2 · · · pg)e,
where pi = (p, fi(ζ2n+1)) (here fi is any integer polynomial which projects to the
fi in the above factorization). We say the prime ideal pi lies over the prime p. If
e is greater than 1, we say the prime p is ramified (in Z[ζ2n+1 ]); otherwise we say
p is unramified. One can verify that 2 is the only ramified rational prime in the
cyclotomic field of order 2N , and that the prime ideal (2, ζ2n+1 + 1) = (ζ2n+1 + 1)
lies above the ideal (2).
We are therefore interested in the explicit factorization of the 2n+1-th cyclotomic
polynomials, x2
n
+1, over Fp[x]. This is settled in [16] when p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and in
[20] when p ≡ 3 (mod 4).
Theorem 2.1. Let p ≡ 1 (mod 4), i.e. p = 2A ·m+ 1, A ≥ 2, m odd. Denote by
Uk the set of all primitive 2
k-th roots of unity modulo p. We have
• If n < A, then x2n + 1 is the product of 2n irreducible linear factors over
Fp:
x2
n
+ 1 =
∏
u∈Un+1
(x+ u).
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• If n ≥ A, then x2n +1 is the product of 2A−1 irreducible binomials over Fp
of degree 2n−A+1:
x2
n
+ 1 =
∏
u∈UA
(x2
n−A+1
+ u).
Theorem 2.2. Let p ≡ 3 (mod 4), i.e. p = 2A ·m− 1, A ≥ 2, m odd. Denote by
Ds(x, a) the Dickson polynomials
⌊ s2 ⌋∑
i=0
s
s− i
(
s− i
i
)
(−a)ixs−2i
over Fp. For n ≥ 2, we have
• If n < A, then x2n + 1 is the product of 2n−1 irreducible trinomials over
Fp:
x2
n
+ 1 =
∏
γ∈Γ
(x2 + γx+ 1),
where Γ is the set of all roots of D2n−1(x, 1).
• If n ≥ A, then x2n + 1 is the product of 2A−1 irreducible trinomials over
Fp of degree 2
n−A+1:
x2
n
+ 1 =
∏
δ∈∆
(x2
n−A+1
+ δx2
n−A − 1),
where ∆ is the set of all roots of D2A−1(x,−1).
2.3. Ideal Lattices. Let K be a number field over Q with degree N , and let OK be
its ring of integers. To treat an ideal in OK as a lattice, we need to map elements
in OK to real vectors. We introduce two ways to do this: the canonical embedding
and the coefficient embedding.
2.3.1. Canonical embedding. Let σ1, σ2, · · · , σs1 be the real embeddings from K to
R, and let
σs1+1, σs1+2, · · · , σs1+s2 ,
σs1+s2+1 = σs1+1, σs1+s2+2 = σs1+2, · · · , σs1+2s2 = σs1+s2
be the complex embeddings from K to C, where · is the complex conjugate. From
these σi’s we can make two different Q-linear embeddings:
Σ = ΣK : K→ Cs1+2s2 , a 7→ (σ1(a), σ2(a), · · · , σs1+2s2(a)), and
Σ′ = Σ′K : K→ Rs1+2s2 , a 7→(σ1(a), · · · , σs1(a),√
2Re(σs1+1(a)),
√
2Im(σs1+1(a)), · · · ,√
2Re(σs1+s2(a)),
√
2Im(σs1+s2(a))).
The
√
2’s are added so that the l2 norms of Σ
′(a) and Σ(a) agree. We call the map
Σ (or Σ′ ) the canonical embedding. Σ′ has the advantage that it embeds OK (and
any nonzero ideal thereof) as a full rank lattice in Rs1+2s2 . The formula for Σ′ may
appear inelegant, but notice that in the case where K/Q is Galois, we have either
s1 = 0 or s2 = 0.
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2.3.2. Coefficient embedding. If one can find a monic integral polynomial f(x) so
that the ring of integers OK is isomorphic to Z[x]/(f(x)), such a number field is
called monogenic. The coefficient embedding of OK in a monogenic field sends an
element to the coefficient vector of the corresponding polynomial in Z[x]/(f(x)),
namely,
C(a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ aN−1xN−1) = (a0, a1, · · · , aN−1).
2.3.3. Ideal lattices. The ring of integers OK of K is a free Z-module, and any ideal
I in OK is a free Z-submodule since Z is principle. Under the canonical embedding
or the coefficient embedding, any such I is sent to a lattice in RN . We call this
image the ideal lattice associated with I, and we denote it also by I.
Usually it is easier to use the canonical embedding in mathematical analysis,
and to use the coefficient embedding in cryptography. For example, the lattice
associated with the prime ideal pi = (p, fi(ζ2n+1)) is generated by the coefficient
vectors of the following polynomials (modulo xN + 1 of course)
fi, xfi, · · · , xN−1fi and p, px, · · · , pxN−1.
The minimum generating set should have only N vectors, which can be found by
computing the Hermite Norm Form.
3. Solving SVP for prime ideal lattice
Before specializing to Z[ζ2n+1 ] = OQ[ζ2n+1 ], we explain our idea to solve SVP for a
prime ideal of OL when L is a general, finite Galois extension of Q. Such an ideal
contains a rational prime p, and therefore occurs as one of the prime ideals, say p1,
in the factorization
pOL = (p1p2 · · · pg)e.
To find a vector of p1 with length within the Minkowski bound, we try to find a
short vector in the sublattice given by the intersection of p1 with some intermediate
field between Q and L. Since this sublattice has smaller dimension, this may lead
to a more efficient algorithm than working in L directly.
More precisely, let G be the Galois group of L over Q. The subgroup D ≤ G
consisting of all elements which set-wise stabilize p1 is called the decomposition
group of p1. That is,
D := {σ ∈ G : σ(p1) = p1}.
Let K be the fixed field of D. That is
K := {x ∈ L : ∀σ ∈ D, σ(x) = x}.
Let OK be its algebraic integer ring. It is well known that the degree of K over Q
is g. This is our desired intermediate field.
Now let c = p1
⋂
OK, and consider the following diagram
p1 OL L R
[L:Q]
c OK K R
g
(p) Z Q R
⊂ ⊂ Σ
′
L
⊂ ⊂ Σ
′
K
β
⊂ ⊂ ⊂
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Here β is chosen to be the R-linear map making the diagram commute. For sim-
plicity let us assume that all embeddings K → C are complex (for instance this is
the case if K 6⊂ R and K/Q is Galois). This is not at all essential; forgoing this
assumption only introduces a factor of
√
2 in the following discussion. We make
this assumption for the sole purpose that β is then just the linear embedding given
by repeating each coordinate [L : Q]/g times. Thus we have
(1) ‖β(v)‖ =
√
[L : Q]
g
· ‖v‖.
Additionally, one may check that the lattice in Rg which is the image of OK has
determinant
√|disc(K)| (something else which recommends the √2’s in the defini-
tion of Σ′), where disc(∗) is the disciminant. It is also not hard to prove that the
norm of c is exactly p. Thus, under the canonical embedding of OK into R
g, any
vector v0 ∈ c within the Minkowski bound satisfies
‖v0‖ ≤ √g · p 1g |disc(K)| 12g .
By equation (1) above, we therefore have
(2) ‖β(v0)‖ ≤ p 1g |disc(K)| 12g ·
√
[L : Q].
On the other hand, the norm of p1 is p
[L:Q]
eg . Hence, when p is unramified in L
(that is, when e = 1) the Minkowski bound for p1 (under the canonical embedding
into R[L:Q]) becomes√
[L : Q] · (p [L:Q]g ) 1[L:Q] · |disc(L)| 12[L:Q] =
√
[L : Q] · (p 1g ) · |disc(L)| 12[L:Q] .
Comparing this with (2), we find that β(v0) lies within the Minkowski bound for
p1 provided that
(3) |disc(K)| 1[K:Q] ≤ |disc(L)| 1[L:Q] .
We have therefore established the following quite general theorem
Theorem 3.1. Suppose L/Q is a finite Galois extension, and suppose p is a prime
ideal of OL lying over an unramified rational prime. If K is the fixed field of the
decomposition group of p, and if the inequality (3) holds, then the problem of finding
a nonzero Minkowski-short vector of p (under the canonical embedding of L) reduces
to the problem of finding a Minkowski-short vector of the sublattice p ∩OK (under
the canonical embedding of K).
Finally note that the sublattice p ∩ OK has dimension no more than half that
of p (unless p = pOL, in which case SVP for p is likely trivial). We do not know
whether (3) holds in general, but it is true for power-of-two cyclotomic fields (see
next subsection) and prime order cyclotomic fields (see the Appendix).
3.1. Solving SVP for a prime ideal lattice in Z[ζ2n+1 ]. For simplicity, we let
ζ = ζ2n+1 . Now we specialize to L = Q(ζ). We say goodbye to the canonical
embedding, and use the coefficient embedding:
Q(ζ) → R2n ,
2n−1∑
i=0
aiζ
i 7→ (a0, a1, ..., a2n−1).
The coefficient embedding is widely used in lattice-based cryptographic construc-
tions. In fact, for power-of-two cyclotomic fields, the two embeddings are related
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by scaled-rotations. The prime 2 is the unique ramified prime in Q(ζ), and the
prime ideal lying over (2) is (2, ζ+1) = (ζ+1). Hence it is easy to find the shortest
vector in the ideal lattice (ζ + 1), and its length is
√
2.
Below we consider a prime ideal lying over an odd prime and show that there is a
hierarchy for the hardness of solving SVP for prime ideal lattices in Z[ζ]. Roughly
speaking, we can classify all the prime ideal lattices into n classes labeled with
1, 2, · · · , n, depending on the congruence class of p (mod 2n+1), and for a prime
ideal lattice in the r-th class, we can always find its shortest vector by solving SVP
in a 2r-dimensional lattice. More precisely, we have:
Theorem 3.2. For any prime ideal p = (p, f(ζ)) in Z[ζ], where p is an odd prime
and f(x) is some irreducible factor of x2
n
+ 1 in Fp[x]. Write
p =
{
2A ·m+ 1, if p ≡ 1 (mod 4);
2A ·m− 1, if p ≡ 3 (mod 4),
for some odd m and A ≥ 2, and let
r =
{
min{A− 1, n}, if p ≡ 1 (mod 4);
min{A, n}, if p ≡ 3 (mod 4).
Then given an oracle that can solve SVP for 2r-dimensional lattice, a shortest
nonzero vector in p can be found in poly(2n, log2 p) time with the coefficient embed-
ding.
Proof. It is well known that the Galois group G of Q(ζ) over Q is isomorphic to
the multiplicative group (Z/2n+1Z)∗. Let G = {σ1, σ3, · · · , σ2n+1−1} where
σi : Q(ζ)→ Q(ζ);
ζ 7→ ζi.
Next we prove the theorem by considering the two cases separately.
Case 1: First we deal with the case when p ≡ 1 (mod 4). The theorem holds
for n < A.
If n ≥ A, we have r = A− 1. By Theorem 2.1, we know that
f(x) = x2
n−A+1
+ u = x2
n−r
+ u
for some u ∈ UA. Then the prime ideal lattice p can be generated by p and
f(ζ) = ζ2
n−r
+u. Consider the subgroup H = 〈σ2r+1+1〉 of G generated by σ2r+1+1.
H is also a subgroup of the decomposition group of the ideal p since
σ2r+1+1(p) = p, σ2r+1+1(f(ζ)) = f(ζ).
Note that K = Q(ζ2
n−r
) is the fixed field of H and its integer ring OK has a Z-basis
(1, ζ2
n−r
, ζ2·2
n−r
, · · · , ζ(2r−1)·2n−r).
Let c = p
⋂
OK. We claim that p is an internal orthogonal direct sum:
(4) p =
2n−r−1⊕
k=0
ζkc.
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Indeed for any a ∈ p, there exist integers zi’s and wi’s such that
a =
2n−1∑
i=0
ziζ
if(ζ) +
2n−1∑
i=0
wipζ
i
=
2n−r−1∑
k=0
ζk
2r−1∑
j=0
(zk+j·2n−rζ
j·2n−rf(ζ) + wk+j·2n−rpζ
j·2n−r )
=
2n−r−1∑
k=0
ζk
(
(
2r−1∑
j=0
zk+j·2n−rζ
j·2n−r )f(ζ) + (
2r−1∑
j=0
wk+j·2n−r ζ
j·2n−r )p
)
.
Let a(k) = (
∑2r−1
j=0 zk+j·2n−rζ
j·2n−r )f(ζ) + (
∑2r−1
j=0 wk+j·2n−r ζ
j·2n−r )p for any k.
Since p ∈ c and f(ζ) ∈ c, a(k) ∈ c. We have established (4).
Since multiplication by ζ is an isometry, (4) implies
λ1(p) = λ1(c),
and that to find the shortest vector in ideal lattice p, it is enough to find the
shortest vector v in the ideal lattice c, a lattice with dimension 2r. Indeed ζkv for
any 0 ≤ k ≤ 2n−r − 1 will be a shortest vector in the ideal lattice p.
Case 2: For the case when p ≡ 3 (mod 4), everything is similar except that
r = A. Indeed by Theorem 2.2, Q(ζ) is a cyclic extension of degree 2n−A+1 over
the decomposition field for p. We sketch the subfield lattice for Q(ζ), and calculate
the decomposition group for p in the appendix.
Algorithm: We can summarize the algorithm to solve SVP in ideal prime lattice
as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Solve SVP in prime ideal lattice
Input: a prime ideal p = (p, f(ζ)) in Z[ζ], where p is odd.
Output: a shortest vector in the corresponding prime ideal lattice.
1: Compute the ideal c generated by p and f(ζ) in OK where K = Q(ζ
2n−r).
2: Find a shortest vector v in the 2r-dimensional lattice c;
3: Output v.
The most time-consuming step in Algorithm 1 is Step 2 and the other steps can
be done in poly(2n, log2 p) time. 
Remark 3.1. Since for any a ∈ p, there exist a(k) ∈ c for 0 ≤ k < 2n−r, such that
a =
∑2n−r−1
k=0 ζ
ka(k), we conclude that if (b(i))0≤i<2r is a basis of the ideal lattice
c, then (ζjb(i))0≤i<2r ,0≤j<2n−r is a basis of the ideal lattice I. Furthermore, for
j1 6= j2, any vector in (ζj1b(i))0≤i<2r is orthogonal to any vector in (ζj2b(i))0≤i<2r .
Denote by Lj the lattice generated by (ζjb(i))0≤i<2r , then we have that the ideal
lattice p has an orthogonal decomposition: L0 ⊕ L1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ L2n−r−1, where Li is
orthogonal to Lj for i 6= j, that is, for any vector v(i) ∈ Li and v(j) ∈ Lj, the inner
product 〈v(i), v(j)〉 = 0.
Remark 3.2. By the remark above, solving the closest vector problem (CVP) for
the prime ideal lattice can be also reduced to solving CVP in some 2r-dimensional
sublattice.
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3.2. The shortest vector of some prime ideal lattice in Z[ζ2n+1 ]. Using The-
orem 3.2, we can now prove Proposition 1.1 in Section 1.2.
For the case p ≡ −3 (mod 8), by Theorem 2.1, x2n+1 = (x2n−1+u1)·(x2n−1+u2)
over Fp[x], where ui satisfies u
2
i ≡ −1 (mod p). By the proof of Theorem 3.2, the
shortest vector of the ideal lattice (p, ζ2
n−1
+ui) can be found efficiently by solving
SVP in the 2-dimensional lattice Li generated by
(
ui 1
p 0
)
. For any vector v ∈ Li,
there exists an integer vector (z1, z2) such that v = (z1ui + z2p, z1). Note that
‖v‖2 = (z1ui + z2p)2 + z21 = z21(u2i + 1) + z22p2 + 2pz1z2ui ≡ 0 (mod p).
If v is the shortest nonzero vector, we have 0 < ‖v‖2 < 4pi · p < 2p (by Minkowski’s
Theorem [23]), which implies that ‖v‖2 = p. Hence the proposition follows in this
case.
Similarly, the proposition holds for p ≡ 3 (mod 8).
3.3. Average-case hardness to solve SVP for prime ideal lattice in Z[ζ].
Precisely defining the average-case hardness of SVP for a prime ideal lattice in Z[ζ]
requires specifying a distribution. We consider the following three distributions.
3.3.1. The first distribution. To select a random prime ideal, one fixes a large M ,
uniformly randomly selects a prime number in the set
{p is a prime : p < M},
and then uniformly randomly selects a prime ideal lying over p. This process
provides a reasonable distribution among prime ideals, since every prime ideal in
the ring of integers of Q[x]/(f(x)) is of the form (p, g(x)), where p is a prime number
and g(x) is an irreducible factor of f(x) over Fp[x]. Since roughly half of all primes
p ≤ M satisfy p ≡ ±3 (mod 8), according to Dirichlet’s theorem on arithmetic
progressions, at least half of all such p have the property that the ideals lying over
p admit an efficient algorithm for SVP.
3.3.2. The second distribution. Again fixing a largeM , we might alternatively select
a prime ideal uniformly at random from the set
{p prime ideal : p ∈ p, p is a prime, p < M}.
In this case, first we would like to point out that
Proposition 3.1. Under the distribution above, a random prime ideal of Z[ζ] ad-
mits an efficient SVP algorithm with probability at least 11+2n−1 .
Proof. For simplicity, we disregard the single prime ideal lying over 2. Note that for
p = 8k ± 3, there are exactly two prime ideals over p, and, by Proposition 1.1, the
SVP for the corresponding ideal lattices is easy. For p = 8k ± 1, there are at most
2n prime ideals lying over p, by Theorem 2.1 and 2.2. Then by Dirichlet’s prime
number theorem, even if we only count the prime ideals lying over p = 8k ± 3, the
fraction of easy instances is at least 11+2n−1 . 
By Theorem 3.2, SVP for a prime ideal lattice p reduces to SVP for a 2r-
dimensional sub-lattice c, where r is as defined in the statement of 3.2. We are
therefore interested in the expected value of r when p is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom according to the second distribution.
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More precisely, for a large integer M > 0, consider the set PSM consisting of all
prime ideals lying over a rational prime p < 2M . An ideal can be chosen uniformly
at random from PSM since PSM is finite. We can then compute the expected
dimension DM of the sub-lattice c, which is about
n∑
A=2
2A−1 · 2
M/2A+1
2M−1
+
n∑
A=2
2A · 2
M/2A+1
2M−1
+
M∑
A=n+1
2n · 2
M/2A+1
2M−1
· 2,
when M is big enough. As M → ∞, the expected dimension of the lattice c tends
to 32n+O(1).
Hence, even with the exponential time algorithm [24] to solve the 2r-dimensional
ideal, the expected running time is still polynomial, that is, poly(2n, log2 p).
3.3.3. The third distribution. The third distribution is more common in mathemat-
ics, but it seems hard to sample. Namely, after fixing a largeM , we select uniformly
at random a prime ideal from the set
{p prime ideal : N (p) < M},
where N (p) is the norm of the ideal p.
By Theorem 3.2, SVP for a prime ideal lattice p reduces to SVP for a 2r-
dimensional sub-lattice c, where r is as defined in the statement of 3.2. Note that
our algorithm will not improve matters if r = n, that is, if p splits completely in
Q(ζ) and hence N (p) = p. By Chebotarev’s density theorem [33], there are about
M
2n logM rational primes which split in Q(ζ) and hence
M
logM prime ideals lying above
those primes, for which our algorithm will not improve the efficiency to solve SVP.
For those prime ideals that our algorithm can do better, we must have the prime
p lying below them must satisfy p ≤ √M since N (p) = pf < M where f is some
integer greater than 1. Hence there are at most
√
M such primes and hence at most
2n−1
√
M prime ideals that our algorithm can do better.
Therefore, under such a distribution, the density of the easy instances for our
algorithm is at most 2
n−1 logM√
M
which goes to zero when M tends to infinity.
4. Solving SVP for general ideal lattice in Z[ζ2n+1 ]
For simplicity, we let ζ = ζ2n+1 . Even for a general ideal lattice I ⊂ Z[ζ], there
is a similar hierarchy for the hardness of SVP for I.
Theorem 4.1. Let I be a nonzero ideal of Z[ζ] with prime factorization
I = p1 · p2 · · · pt,
where pi = (fi(ζ), pi) for rational primes pi, and where the pi are not necessarily
distinct. Write pi = 2
Ai ·mi + 1 when pi ≡ 1 (mod 4) and pi = 2Ai ·mi − 1 when
pi ≡ 3 (mod 4) with odd mi, and let r = max{ri}, where
ri =


min{Ai − 1, n}, if pi ≡ 1 (mod 4);
min{Ai, n}, if pi ≡ 3 (mod 4);
n, if pi = 2.
Then the shortest vector in the ideal lattice L corresponding to I can be solved via
solving SVP in a 2r-dimensional lattice.
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Proof. If r = n, then the theorem follows simply.
If r < n, W.L.O.G., we assume r = r1. Following the proof of Theorem 3.2,
denote the Galois group G = {σ1, σ3, · · · , σ2n+1−1} of Q(ζ) over Q, where σi(ζ) =
ζi. Consider the subgroup H = 〈σ2r+1+1〉 of G generated by σ2r+1+1. For any
τ ∈ H and every prime ideal pi = (pi, fi(ζ)), we have τ(pi) = pi since σ2r+1+1(pi) =
pi, σ2r+1+1(fi(ζ)) = fi(ζ). Note that K = Q(ζ
2n−r ) is the fixed field of H and its
integer ring OK has a Z-basis (1, ζ
2n−r , ζ2·2
n−r
, · · · , ζ(2r−1)·2n−r).
Let c = I ⋂OK. We claim that for any a ∈ I, there exist a(k) ∈ c for 0 ≤ k <
2n−r, such that
a =
2n−r−1∑
k=0
ζka(k).
We proceed by induction. When t = 1 the above claim holds by Theorem 3.2.
Suppose the claim holds for t − 1. Then setting I = p1 · p2 · · · pt, and I = p1 ·
p2 · · · pt−1, we have I = I · pt. For any a ∈ I, we can write a =
∑
xiyi where
xi ∈ I and yi ∈ pt. It suffices to show that for any xy, where x ∈ I and y ∈ pt,
there exist b(k) ∈ I⋂OK for 0 ≤ k < 2n−r, such that xy =∑2n−r−1k=0 ζkb(k).
By the induction assumption, there exist x(i) ∈ I⋂OK for 0 ≤ i < 2n−r such
that x =
∑2n−r−1
i=0 ζ
ix(i), and there exist y(j) ∈ pt
⋂
OK for 0 ≤ j < 2n−r such that
y =
∑2n−r−1
j=0 ζ
jy(j). Hence, we have
xy =
2n−r−1∑
i=0
2n−r−1∑
j=0
ζi+jx(i)y(j)
=
2n−r−1∑
k=0
ζk
∑
i+j=k
x(i)y(j) +
2·2n−r−2∑
k=2n−r
ζk
∑
i+j=k
x(i)y(j)
=
2n−r−1∑
k=0
ζk
∑
i+j=k
x(i)y(j) +
2n−r−2∑
k=0
ζk
∑
i+j=k+2n−r
ζ2
n−r
x(i)y(j)
=
2n−r−2∑
k=0
ζk(
∑
i+j=k
x(i)y(j) +
∑
i+j=k+2n−r
ζ2
n−r
x(i)y(j)) + ζ2
n−r−1 ∑
i+j=2n−r−1
x(i)y(j).
Let b(k) =
∑
i+j=k x
(i)y(j) +
∑
i+j=k+2n−r ζ
2n−rx(i)y(j) for any 0 ≤ k ≤ 2n−r − 2
and b(2
n−r−1) =
∑
i+j=2n−r−1 x
(i)y(j). We have that b(k) ∈ I⋂OK for 0 ≤ k <
2n−r. Hence, for any a ∈ I, there exist a(k) ∈ c for 0 ≤ k < 2n−r, such that
a =
∑2n−r−1
k=0 ζ
ka(k).
As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can show that λ1(I) = λ1(c) and any nonzero
shortest vector in c will yield 2n−r nonzero shortest vectors in I.

We would like to point out that in some cases, the r in Theorem 4.1 can be
improved. Consider the case when n ≥ 3 and I = (2, ζ − 1)2 = (2, ζ2 + 1). We
need to solve SVP in a 2n-dimensional lattice by Theorem 4.1. However, using
the intermediate field Q(ζ2) as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can find a shortest
vector by solving SVP in a 2n−1-dimensional lattice.
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Furthermore, since for any a ∈ I, there exist a(k) ∈ c for 0 ≤ k < 2n−r, such
that a =
∑2n−r−1
k=0 ζ
ka(k), we conclude that if (b(i))0≤i<2r is a basis of the ideal
lattice c, then (ζjb(i))0≤i<2r ,0≤j<2n−r is a basis of ideal lattice I. Denote by Lj the
lattice generated by (ζjb(i))0≤i<2r . Then we have that the ideal lattice I has an
orthogonal decomposition: L0 ⊕ L1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ L2n−r−1, where Li is orthogonal to Lj
for i 6= j.
In fact, for any r¯, let c = I⋂OK where K = Q(ζ2n−r¯ ). For any basis (b(i))0≤i<2r¯
of the ideal lattice c, if (ζjb(i))0≤i<2r¯ ,0≤j<2n−r¯ is a basis of the ideal lattice I (mean-
ing that the ideal lattice I has an orthogonal decomposition), then the shortest
vector in c is also a shortest vector in I. Hence we have the following algorithm to
solve SVP for general ideal in Z[ζ].
Algorithm 2 Solve SVP in general ideal lattice
Input: an ideal I;
Output: a shortest vector in the corresponding ideal lattice L.
1: for r¯ = 1 to n do
2: Compute a basis (b(i))0≤i<2r¯ of the ideal lattice c = I
⋂
OK, where K =
Q(ζ2
n−r¯
).
3: if (ζjb(i))0≤i<2r¯ ,0≤j<2n−r¯ is exactly a basis of ideal lattice I then
4: Find a shortest vector v in the 2r¯-dimensional lattice c;
5: Output v.
6: end if
7: end for
Note that Step 2 can be done efficiently by taking OK as a lattice and then
computing the intersection of the lattice I and the lattice OK under the coefficient
embedding.
Remark 4.1. By Theorem 4.1, solving the closest vector problem (CVP) for the
general ideal lattice can be also reduced to solving CVP in some 2r-dimensional
lattice.
5. Conclusion and open problems
We have investigated the SVP of prime ideal lattices in the power-of-two cyclo-
tomic fields, and designed an algorithm exploiting the subfield structure of such
fields to efficiently solve SVP for a large portion of such ideals. Using ideal factor-
ization, we obtained an efficient algorithm for many general (non prime) ideals. We
also determined the length of the shortest vector of those prime ideals lying over
rational primes congruent to ±3 (mod 8). It is an interesting problem to study the
length of the shortest vectors in other prime ideals. The worst case hardness of
prime ideal lattice SVP for power-of-two cyclotomic fields is also left open.
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Appendix A. Q(ζp)
For p a prime, we described subfields of Q(ζp) and their discriminants. It is well-
known (see for instance [12, Thm 14.5]) that subfields of Q(ζp) have the form
Q(
∑
b∈B
ζbp)
where B is a subgroup of (Z/pZ)∗. The discriminant of such a subfield, K, is
described by a simple formula in terms of its degree over Q:
disc(K/Q) = p[K:Q]−1.
This can be seen using the Führerdiskriminantenproduktformel (see [34, Thm
3.11]), which says the following. For H a group of Dirichlet characters of Z/mZ
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(that is, a group of group homomorphisms h : (Z/mZ)∗ → C∗), the fixed field of
∩h∈Hker(h) in Q(ζm) has discriminant with magnitude∏
h∈H
Ch,
where Ch is the conductor of h. That is, Ch is the minimum among divisors n|m
for which there exists a group homomorphism
h′ : (Z/nZ)∗ → C∗
such that h = h′ ◦ pim,n, where pim,n : (Z/mZ)∗ → (Z/nZ)∗ is the restriction of the
natural projection. And the fixed field of ∩h∈Hker(h) has degree |H | over Q.
In the present case, the only choice for pip,n is pip,1, or pip,p. Thus Ch = p for every
nontrivial character h. For K the fixed field of ∩h∈Hker(h), the Führerdiskrimi-
nantenproduktformel therefore gives
disc(K) =
∏
h∈H
Ch = p
|H|−1 = p[K:Q]−1.
Appendix B. Q(ζ2n)
Now we sketch the subfield lattice of Q(ζ2n+1). Consider the three subfields
Q(ζ2n+1 + ζ
−1
2n+1), Q(ζ2n), Q(ζ2n+1 − ζ−12n+1).
First we claim Q(ζ2n+1) is degree two over each: On the one hand, all are proper
subfields since
Q(ζ2n+1 + ζ
−1
2n+1)
is contained in the fixed field of the automorphism ζ2n+1 7→ ζ−12n+1 , and
Q(ζ2n+1 − ζ−12n+1),
is in the fixed field of the automorphism ζ2n+1 7→ −ζ−12n+1 . On the other hand, ζ2n+1
is a root of the quadratic polynomials
x2 − (ζ2n+1 + ζ−12n+1)x+ 1 ∈ Q(ζ2n + ζ−12n+1)[x],
x2 − (ζ2n+1 − ζ−12n+1)x− 1 ∈ Q(ζ2n+1 − ζ−12n+1)[x].
Moreover, since the involutions
ζ2n+1 7→ ζ−12n+1 , ζ2n+1 7→ ζ2
n−1+1
2n+1 , ζ2n+1 7→ −ζ−12n+1
are distinct, these three subfields are distinct. Finally it is routine to sketch the
subgroup lattice of
Z2 ⊕ Z2n−1 ∼= (Z/2n+1Z)∗ ∼= Gal(Q(ζ2n+1)/Q) :
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〈(0, 0)〉
〈(1, 0)〉 〈(0, 2n−2)〉 〈(1, 2n−2)〉
〈(1, 0), (0, 2n−2)〉 〈(0, 2n−3)〉 〈(1, 2n−3)〉
〈(1, 0), (0, 2n−3)〉 〈(0, 2n−4)〉 〈(1, 2n−4)〉
...
...
...
〈(1, 0), (0, 2)〉 〈(0, 1)〉 〈(1, 1)〉
Z2 ⊕ Z2n−1
Here all lines indicate extensions of index two. Combining these facts we have the
subfield lattice for Q(ζ2n):
Q(ζ2n+1)
Q(ζ2n+1 + ζ
−1
2n+1) Q(ζ2n) Q(ζ2n+1 − ζ−12n+1)
Q(ζ2n + ζ
−1
2n ) Q(ζ2n−1) Q(ζ2n − ζ−12n )
Q(ζ2n−1 + ζ
−1
2n−1) Q(ζ2n−2) Q(ζ2n−1 − ζ−12n−1)
...
...
...
Q(ζ8 + ζ
−1
8 ) Q(i) Q(ζ8 − ζ−18 )
Q
Where all lines indicate extensions of order two.
Appendix C. Decomposition groups and fixed fields
Let ζ = ζ2n+1 , p a rational prime with p ≡ 3 (mod 4), A the natural number
with 2A||p+ 1, and let p be a prime ideal in Z[ζ] containing p. Then
p = (p, ζ2
n−A+1
+ δζ2
n−A − 1)
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for some δ ∈ Z. Let σ ∈ Aut(Q(ζ)/Q) be the automorphism of Q(ζ) with ζ 7→
ζ−2
A−1. Then we have
σp = (p, σ(ζ)2
n−A+1
+ δσ(ζ)2
n−A − 1)
= (p, ζ2
n−A+1(−2A−1) + δζ2
n−A(−2A−1) − 1)
= (p, ζ−2
n+1
ζ−2
n−A+1
+ δζ−2
n
ζ−2
n−A − 1)
= (p, ζ−2
n−A+1 − δζ−2n−A − 1)
= (p, −ζ−2n−A+1 · (ζ2n−A+1 + δζ2n−A − 1))
= p.
We have used the fact that ζ is a unit in Z[ζ].
Since ζ 7→ ζ−1 is an involution, the order of σ is the order of ζ 7→ ζ2A+1 (denoted
by σ′ ) which is the multiplicative order of 2A + 1 in (Z/2n+1Z)∗. We claim that,
for A ≥ 2, this order is 2n+1−A: First note that for k ≡ 1 (mod 4),
ordZ∗
2n+1
(k) = 2m
if and only if 2n+1||k2m − 1. This fact follows easily from the identity
k2
g+1 − 1 = (k2g − 1)(k2g + 1)
and the fact that for k = 2A+1, we have 2||(k2g +1). Now, that the multiplicative
order of 2A + 1 is 2n+1−A follows from an induction argument using the above
identity.
The preceding two paragraphs prove that σ lies in the decomposition group of
p and that σ has order 2n+1−A. It follows from a standard result in the theory of
number fields that the decomposition group of p has order 2n+1−A. Thus 〈σ〉 is
precisely the decomposition group of p. Now recall the subfield/subgroup lattice
for Q(ζ)/Q and its Galois group Z∗2n+1 . A simple computation shows that σ fixes
ζ2
n−A − ζ−2n−A . But from the subfield lattice we can see that
[Q(ζ) : Q(ζ2
n−A − ζ−2n−A)] = 2n+1−A = |〈σ〉|.
Thus Q(ζ2
n−A − ζ−2n−A) is precisely this fixed field.
A similar, in fact easier, analysis can be carried out for p ≡ 1 (mod 4). In this
case
p = (p, ζ2
n−A+1 − u)
for some u ∈ Z and 2A||p− 1. Then it is seen that σ′ fixes p. As in the 3 (mod 4)
case, we know from a general result of algebraic number theory that the decom-
position group of p has order 2n+1−A, which matches the order of σ′ (computed
above). We see that Q(ζ2
n+1−A
) is contained in the fixed field of σ′, and again, by
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looking at the subfield lattice to find [Q(ζ) : Q(ζ2
n+1−A
)] = 2n+1−A, we see that
Q(ζ2
n+1−A
) is precisely the fixed field of the decomposition group of p.
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